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NOTE: 
 
Why Justice Kavanaugh Should Continue 
Justice Kennedy’s Death Penalty 
Legacy—Next Step: Expanding Juvenile 
Death Penalty Ban 
ALLI KATZEN* 
As science and society both progress, Supreme Court 
rulings should reflect those changes. The national consensus 
has been gradually moving away from the use of the death 
penalty, particularly as applied to offenders between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-five. Research clarifies that the 
brain is not fully developed in the areas most directly linked 
to culpability until after this age range. The combination of 
these factors should compel the Court to raise the minimum 
age for death sentences, but the shifting bench presents un-
predictability.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“Even if true, teenagers!”1 This is the sentiment expressed by 
Senator Scott Newman about the alleged sexual assaults committed 
by future Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh when he was in 
high school and college. While Justice Kavanaugh categorically de-
nied the sexual assault claims, many of his defenders maintained 
that even if the accusations were true, his previous actions should 
not play a role in his confirmation to the highest court. In other 
words, his actions as a teenager should not matter twenty or thirty 
years later. But do Justice Kavanaugh and his supporters feel the 
same is true about defendants who face the possibility of death—a 
consequence lasting much longer than twenty or thirty years later—
for their actions taken before the age of twenty-five? If the Supreme 
Court decides whether sentencing offenders under the age of 
 
 1 Senator Scott Newman (@SenatorNewmanMN), TWITTER (Sept. 17, 2018, 
1:38 PM), https://twitter.com/SenatorNewmanMN/ 
status/1041758288440950787?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetem-
bed%7Ctwterm%5E1041758288440950787&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2F 
www.twincities.com%2F2018%2F09%2F18%2Fmn-senator-scott-newman-
teenagers-tweet-over-brett-kavanaugh-sex-allegation-goes-viral%2F. 
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twenty-five to death is constitutional, Justice Kavanaugh could be 
viewed as a hypocrite if he votes in favor of such a sentence.    
The Court has been on a path towards declaring the death pen-
alty unconstitutional since 1972, when the Supreme Court effec-
tively suspended imposition of the death penalty by holding that it 
was unconstitutional as applied.2 Although the nationwide morato-
rium ended only a few years later when states amended their death 
penalty statutes,3 the Supreme Court continued to limit the revised 
statutes. Most notably, the Court struck down mandatory death sen-
tences,4 death sentences for offenders who lacked the intention to 
kill,5 death sentences for offenders with mental disabilities,6 and 
death sentences for offenders who were under the age of eighteen at 
the time of the offense.7 
However, with the loss of the Court’s “pivotal swing vote” from 
the bench,8 and the addition of the newest justice nominated by a 
President who tweets thoughts like “SHOULD GET DEATH 
PENALTY!” about criminal defendants,9 the future of death penalty 
jurisprudence may be in jeopardy. This Note argues that death pen-
alty jurisprudence should continue expanding the ban to apply to 
offenders under the age of twenty-five. Furthermore, this Note will 
 
 2 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 3 Olivia B. Waxman, The Story of the Last U.S. Execution Before a Nation-
wide Moratorium Took Effect 50 Years Ago, TIME (June 2, 2017), 
http://time.com/4801230/last-execution-before-moratorium/. 
 4 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 5 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 6 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 7 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 8 Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy, the Pivotal Swing Vote on the Supreme 
Court, Announces His Retirement, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/justice-kennedy-the-piv-
otal-swing-vote-on-the-supreme-court-announces-retire-
ment/2018/06/27/a40a8c64-5932-11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html. On June 
27, 2018, Justice Kennedy announced his resignation from the Court. Id. 
 9 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2017, 8:43 
PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/sta-
tus/925931294705545216?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetem-
bed%7Ctw-
term%5E925931294705545216&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguard-
ian.com%2Fus-news%2F2018%2Fsep%2F06%2Fterrorist-attack-new-york-
trump-tweet-death-penalty. 
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discuss why Justice Kavanaugh may, and should, continue Justice 
Kennedy’s legacy as the swing vote in death penalty cases. 
Part I of this Note overviews the relevant death penalty and ju-
venile sentencing cases. This Part introduces the proportionality 
analysis that courts utilize in Eighth Amendment cases. Part II ap-
plies that proportionality analysis to death sentences imposed on of-
fenders under the age of twenty-five. It first explores how the na-
tional consensus reflects society’s departure from the practice, and 
then discusses pertinent brain development research that supports 
this consensus. Part II concludes by showing why legitimate peno-
logical goals are not furthered by sentencing offenders under the age 
of twenty-five to death. Finally, Part III assesses how this issue may 
play out in the Court, with an analysis of Justice Kavanaugh’s pre-
Supreme Court opinions and writings. This Note concludes that, 
consistent with science, his own jurisprudence, and national and in-
ternational trends, Justice Kavanaugh should vote against imposing 
the death sentence on offenders under twenty-five if the issue is pre-
sented before him. 
I. DEATH PENALTY AND JUVENILE SENTENCING JURISPRUDENCE 
In the last two decades, the Court has made sweeping, categori-
cal sentencing limitations applicable to specific groups of people: a 
ban on death sentences for mentally disabled10 and juvenile offend-
ers,11 a ban on life without the possibility of parole sentences for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders,12 and most recently, a ban on man-
datory life without parole sentencing schemes for juveniles.13 Ulti-
mately, these cases turned on whether the sentence violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.”14 
These landmark opinions provide insight and guidance on how the 
Court arrives at its decisions through a process often referred to as 
the “proportionality” analysis.15 
 
 10 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 11 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 12 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 13 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 15 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008). 
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The concept of proportionality appears in Supreme Court opin-
ions as far back as 1910, when the Court stated that “it is a precept 
of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and pro-
portioned to [the] offense.”16 The Court explained that, while a pun-
ishment may not be cruel and unusual on its face, it may violate the 
Eighth Amendment in light of the crime that fashioned the punish-
ment or the offender whom it is punishing.17 While originalist inter-
preters of the Constitution may argue that a punishment should only 
violate the Eighth Amendment if the Founders would have consid-
ered it to be cruel and unusual,18 the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
rejected that interpretation in this context.19 
The Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis is conducted 
through the lens of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”20 Although the cruel and unusual 
Eighth Amendment “standard itself remains the same, . . . its ap-
plicability must change as the basic mores of society change.”21 For 
the Court to assess if a punishment is disproportionate to a crime—
and therefore is cruel and unusual according to society’s current 
standards—it looks at “objective factors to the maximum possible 
extent.”22 The Court has “pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most 
 
 16 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
 17 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (“[E]ven though ‘imprison-
ment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or 
unusual,’ it may not be imposed as a penalty for ‘the “status” of narcotic addi-
tion’ . . . because such a sanction would be excessive.”) (quoting Robinson v. Cal-
ifornia, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)). 
 18 Originalist View of Death Penalty Under 8th Amendment, C-SPAN (Oct. 
8, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4624027/originalist-view-death-pen-
alty-8th-amendment (clip, title, and description were not created by C-SPAN). 
 19 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (“A claim that punishment is excessive is judged 
not by the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the 
‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that 
currently prevail.”). 
 20 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 21 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 22 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment judg-
ments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual 
Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum pos-
sible extent.”). 
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reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is . . . legisla-
tion.’”23 
This analysis is concluded “by asking whether there is reason to 
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legisla-
tors.”24 The Court must determine whether the penalty in question 
furthers the penological goals that the death penalty is meant to ad-
dress.25 As such, this Note will follow a similar approach to deter-
mine whether the death penalty ban should be extended to offenders 
up to the age of twenty-five. 
A. The Death Penalty as Disproportionate 
Two cases that most clearly illustrate the Supreme Court’s ap-
plication of the death penalty proportionality jurisprudence are At-
kins v. Virginia26 and Roper v. Simmons.27 In 2002, the Atkins Court 
imposed a categorical ban on death sentences for “mentally retarded 
defendants.”28 The Court not only examined the number of states 
that passed legislation banning the death penalty for the mentally 
disabled, but it also looked at what was actually occurring in prac-
tice.29 It noted that despite the fact that less than half of the states 
had passed such legislation, “the practice [was] uncommon” in the 
states where it was still legal.30 When considered in combination 
with the number of states that had an outright prohibition on the 
death penalty for this class of defendants, the Court found that “a 
national consensus ha[d] developed against” the execution of men-
tally disabled offenders.31 
The Court decided that it had “no reason to disagree” with the 
national consensus that had formed against the death penalty as a 
punishment for the mentally disabled because such a punishment did 
 
 23 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 
(1989)). 
 24 Id. at 313. 
 25 Id. at 319. 
 26 Id. at 304. 
 27 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 28 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 29 Id. at 314–16 (finding that after Congress passed legislation forbidding a 
death sentence for mentally disabled defendants, at least eighteen states “followed 
suit”). 
 30 Id. at 316. 
 31 Id.  
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not further the penological goals of a death sentence.32 The two 
goals that the death penalty is meant to serve are retribution and de-
terrence.33 The theory of retribution rests upon “the interest in seeing 
that the offender gets his ‘just deserts,’”34 or simply stated, the pun-
ishment that he deserves. Therefore, because a death sentence is the 
most severe punishment, it should be reserved for only the most cul-
pable offenders.35 The Court found that offenders who have “subav-
erage intellectual functioning” are less culpable, and ruled that when 
it “appl[ied] the Eighth Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving 
standards of decency,’” sentencing a “mentally retarded offender” 
to death is forbidden under the Constitution.36 
As the country’s national consensus increasingly rejected the use 
of the death penalty for certain groups of offenders, the Court fol-
lowed suit.37 Three years after Atkins was decided, the Court in 
Roper v. Simmons made another categorical ban on the death pen-
alty, this time for offenders under the age of eighteen.38 This ruling 
was an extension of a previous Supreme Court decision, Thompson 
v. Oklahoma, where the Court found the death penalty was uncon-
stitutional for offenders under the age of sixteen.39 Just as the Atkins 
Court began its analysis by examining the national consensus on the 
issue, the Roper Court began with “a review of objective indicia of 
[a national] consensus.”40 
To assess the national consensus, both Atkins and Roper consid-
ered both legislative action and legislative restraint, emphasizing the 
presence of legislation prohibiting the death penalty for the relevant 
class of offenders.41 This was compounded by the lack of legislation 
reinstating the death penalty where it had previously been abol-
ished.42 After taking into account that no state “that previously pro-
hibited capital punishment for juveniles” had reinstated it since the 
 
 32 Id. at 321. 
 33 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). 
 34 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 321. 
 37 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
 38 Id. at 578. 
 39 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 40 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
 41 Id. at 566. 
 42 Id. 
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last time the issue was before the Court, and that a majority of states 
passed legislation banning the death penalty for juveniles, the Roper 
Court found that the national consensus was against the juvenile 
death penalty.43 The Court then exercised its “own independent 
judgment” to determine whether it agreed with the national consen-
sus as to “whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punish-
ment for juveniles.”44 Ultimately, it found that the punishment was 
in fact disproportionate, and declared it unconstitutional as juveniles 
“cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders” for 
whom the death penalty is reserved.45 
B. Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentencing as Disproportionate 
The Court employs the proportionality analysis in two types of 
cases: “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences” and 
“categorical restrictions on the death penalty.”46 The term-of-years 
sentencing cases encompass restrictions on juvenile sentencing, and 
therefore both groups of cases are critical to this Note, which advo-
cates for banning the death penalty for a larger group of the popula-
tion. 
Five years after the Court declared that the death penalty is an 
unconstitutional punishment for offenders under the age of eighteen, 
the Court continued to categorize punishments as cruel and unusual 
as applied to certain groups of people. In 2010, the Court declared 
in Graham v. Florida that, in addition to the requirement that juve-
niles be exempt from the death penalty, they must also be exempt 
from life without parole sentences if convicted of a non-homicidal 
crime.47 While the Graham Court used the proportionality analysis, 
it noted that this test was usually applied differently in non-death 
penalty cases.48 Yet the approach previously seen in cases of 
 
 43 Id. at 564–67 (calculating that thirty states “prohibit[ed] the juvenile death 
penalty, comprising 12 that ha[d] rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that 
maintain[ed] it but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude[d] ju-
veniles from its reach”). 
 44 Id. at 564. 
 45 Id. at 569. 
 46 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010). 
 47 Id at 82. 
 48 Id. at 60–62 (explaining that in challenges to term-of-years sentences the 
“court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the 
sentence”). Justice Kennedy stated that it is difficult for a challenger in this type 
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categorical restrictions to the death penalty is appropriate when “a 
sentencing practice itself is in question,” as was the case in Gra-
ham.49 
As such, the Court began its analysis by looking at the “objective 
indicia of national consensus.”50 The Court rejected the State’s ar-
gument that there was no “national consensus against [sentencing 
juvenile offenders to life without parole]” despite the underwhelm-
ing number of jurisdictions that prohibit such a sentence.51 The 
Court explained that the State’s argument was “incomplete” because 
legislation is not the only way to gauge consensus. Rather, “[a]ctual 
sentencing practices are an important part of the Court’s inquiry into 
consensus.”52 The actual sentencing practices revealed that there 
was a national consensus against life without parole for juvenile 
non-homicide offenders, evidenced by the fact that the practice was 
the “most infrequent” in jurisdictions that did not legislate against 
its use.53 
When faced with another challenge against a juvenile sentencing 
scheme, the Court followed the Roper and Graham Courts in finding 
 
of case to succeed because the Eighth Amendment “‘does not require strict pro-
portionality between crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sen-
tences that [are] “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’” If the Court makes the 
rare finding that there is “an inference of gross disproportionality,” it then contin-
ues the analysis by comparing the sentence at issue with similar cases in other 
jurisdictions. Only if the comparison confirms the Court’s inference does it then 
find the punishment to be unconstitutional. Id. at 60 (quoting Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment). 
 49 Graham, 560 U.S. at 61–62. 
 50 Id. at 62. 
 51 Id. (“Six jurisdictions do not allow life without parole sentences for any 
juvenile offenders . . . . Seven jurisdictions permit life without parole for juvenile 
offenders, but only for homicide crimes . . . . Thirty-seven States as well as the 
District of Columbia permit sentences of life without parole for a juvenile non-
homicide offender in some circumstances . . . . Federal law also allows for the 
possibility of life without parole for offenders as young as 13.”) 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 62–64 (finding that in practice, “only 11 jurisdictions nationwide in 
fact impose life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders – 
and most of those do so quite rarely – while 26 States, the District of Columbia, 
and the Federal Government do not impose them despite apparent statutory au-
thorization”). 
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the practice unconstitutional.54 Mirroring the reasoning in Graham, 
the Court in Miller v. Alabama considered the national consensus 
against mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile homi-
cide offenders and again, focused heavily on what actual practices 
suggested.55 In both Graham and Miller, the Court emphasized that 
life without parole sentences for juveniles are akin to death sen-
tences when imposed at such a young age.56 Thus, it concluded that 
the penological goals were not served because young offenders are 
more susceptible to rehabilitation, and in turn, found the practices to 
be unconstitutional.57 
II. APPLYING PROPORTIONALITY TO OFFENDERS UNDER TWENTY-
FIVE SENTENCED TO DEATH 
As illustrated by the landmark cases discussed in Part I, the 
Court relies heavily on objective indicia of a national consensus as 
the initial part of its proportionality analysis.58 Accordingly, this 
analysis begins by examining the application of death penalty to of-
fenders under the age of twenty-five. 
A. The Consensus 
1. DEATH PENALTY LEGISLATION 
The proportionality analysis is conducted to determine whether 
a punishment is excessive under society’s evolving standards. Ac-
cordingly, the Court relies on objective factors to form its decision.59 
A thorough analysis must begin with an examination of the pertinent 
legislation, as it is “most reliable objective evidence of contempo-
rary values.”60 A review of the nation’s legislation reveals a national 
consensus against the death penalty overall. Currently, twenty states 
and the District of Columbia have outlawed the use of the death pen-
alty entirely, with eight of those states doing so after Roper was 
 
 54 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 55 Id. at 482–87. 
 56 See id. at 474; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010). 
 57 Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. 
 58 Id. at 482. 
 59 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002). 
 60 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). 
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decided in 2005.61 Of the thirty states that still permit the death pen-
alty, three of them have imposed a moratorium since Roper.62 Al-
though no state has passed legislation to extend the juvenile death 
penalty ban beyond what is required by Roper, one state’s judiciary 
has redrawn the line.63 In 2017, a Kentucky circuit court declared 
the state’s death penalty statute unconstitutional as applied to of-
fenders who were under the age of twenty-one at the time of the 
offense.64 Thus, there are effectively twenty-four states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia that ban the death penalty for offenders under the 
age of at least twenty-one, with twelve of these states having estab-
lished the ban in the fifteen years since Roper was decided.65 
Notably, there are few states that have reinstated the death pen-
alty since abolishing it. Only Nebraska has done so, and only after a 
dramatic political battle ensued.66 The Court has emphasized the im-
portance of the inconsequential number of states that have legislated 
to reinstate the death penalty compared to the many states that have 
legislatively abolished it.67 The Atkins Court explained that, in light 
of the “fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legis-
lation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime,” the 
comparison between the number of states that reinstate the death 
penalty and the amount of states that pass legislation to prohibit the 
death penalty is “powerful evidence” of the national consensus.68 
While, in Atkins, the comparison between the two numbers was 
stark (zero states had reinstated the death penalty while sixteen had 
 
 61 States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559 (Ky. 
Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017). 
 64 Id. 
 65 States with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 61. 
 66 Grant Schulte, Nebraska Set for Execution After About-Face on Death 
Penalty, AP NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.ap-
news.com/1f4837c843074ffca2d1684583334b00. In 2015, the Nebraska legisla-
ture voted to abolish the death penalty, only to have the bill vetoed by Governor 
Ricketts. The legislature successfully overrode the veto, but a year later, Ricketts 
poured his own money into a successful campaign to reinstate the death penalty. 
 67 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 315–16 (2002). 
 68 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–16. 
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abolished it since the issue was last before the Court),69 a less stark 
contrast in Roper was still sufficient for the Court to find a national 
consensus against the death penalty for juveniles.70 Although no 
state restored the death penalty for juveniles in the fifteen years since 
the Court approved the punishment,71 only five states had eradicated 
the practice.72 The Roper Court professed that, while the “rate of 
change” was “less dramatic” or “telling” than it was in Atkins, it was 
still significant because it exemplified a trend.73 
When comparing the rate of change that the Roper Court found 
indicative of a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty 
with the rate of change that has occurred since the Court last made 
a categorical restriction on the death penalty based on age in Roper, 
there appears to be a national consensus against the death penalty as 
applied to offenders at least under the age of twenty-one, if not also 
for offenders under the age of twenty-five.74 Five states abolished 
and zero states reinstated the death penalty for juveniles in the fif-
teen years between Stanford and Roper.75 In the fifteen years since 
the Court held that eighteen is the minimum age at which an of-
fender may be sentenced to death, one state has raised the minimum 
age to twenty-one,76 and eleven jurisdictions have abandoned the 
death penalty altogether, albeit some only temporarily.77 Although 
 
 69 Id. There was a thirteen-year gap between 1989, when the Court decided 
in Penry v. Lynaugh that sentencing a mentally disabled person to death was not 
a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and when the Court confronted the same 
issue in Atkins in 2002, overruling Penry. Compare id., with Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). 
 70 Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. 
 71 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding imposition 
of the death penalty “on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age . . . does 
not offend the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment”). 
 72 Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. 
 73 Id. at 565–66 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315, n.18). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–66. 
 76 Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559 (Ky. Cir. 
Ct. Aug. 1, 2017). 
 77 Eight states (Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, and Washington) have abolished the death penalty since 
Roper and three states (Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Oregon) have imposed gu-
bernatorial moratoria since Roper. States with and Without the Death Penalty, 
supra note 61. 
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no state has specifically legislated to extend the juvenile restriction 
to offenders under the age of twenty-five, the Court has continu-
ously emphasized that “[i]t is not so much the number of these 
[s]tates that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of 
change.”78 
Further evidencing the national consensus in favor of raising the 
minimum age at which one may receive a death sentence, the Amer-
ican Bar Association (“ABA”) adopted a resolution in 2018 urging 
jurisdictions to raise the minimum age above what is currently man-
dated by Roper.79 Considered to be the “voice of America’s legal 
profession,” the ABA is highly influential and persuasive in decid-
ing modern legal issues, and should therefore carry great weight 
when expressing opinions on judicial matters.80 
The trend is clear: states are increasingly abolishing the death 
penalty entirely, rather than legislating the minimum age.81 While 
only one state has raised the minimum age, and only as high as age 
twenty-one, and no state (or, more accurately, none out of the one 
that raised the minimum age) has reinstated the death penalty for 
offenders aged eighteen to twenty-five, it is nonetheless “powerful 
evidence” that no state that prohibited the death penalty at the time 
of Roper has since reinstated it.82 
 
 78 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315. 
 79 A.B.A. Res. 111 (Feb. 2018). The resolution adopted a report that based its 
finding on case law, brain development research, trends in legislation, and analy-
sis of the penological goals, to determine that offenders who committed a crime 
before the age of twenty-one should be barred from receiving a death sentence. 
Id. 
 80 William C. Hubbard, Respect and Influence: The ABA’s Voice Is Strength-
ened by Members’ Efforts, A.B.A. J. (2015), http://www.abajournal.com/maga-
zine/article/respect_and_influence_the_abas_voice_is_strengthened_by_mem-
bers_efforts. 
 81 However, since Kentucky recently became the first state to raise the mini-
mum age past eighteen, rather than abolish the death penalty completely, other 
conservative states may follow suit as raising the minimum age is less extreme 
than outright abolition. 
 82 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. Nebraska’s reinstatement of the death penalty in 
2016 should not carry weight in the national consensus analysis. It has effectively 
remained the same since Roper was decided, as Nebraska did not abolish the death 
penalty until 2015 through a veto override. See Schulte, supra note 66. Thus, if 
its reinstatement carried weight in the analysis, so too would its initial abolish-
ment. 
2020] EXPANDING JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY BAN 977 
 
Furthermore, the fact that only one state has raised the minimum 
age above eighteen and none have gone as far as twenty-five is not 
as damning to the state of the national consensus as it may appear at 
first glance. In Graham, the Court explained that the “evidence of 
consensus is not undermined by the fact that many jurisdictions do 
not prohibit” the punishment at issue.83 The Court demonstrated that 
the nature of the sentencing scheme and, thus, the actual sentencing 
practice, revealed that although a great majority of jurisdictions had 
not declared the sentencing practice at issue unconstitutional, “it 
does not necessarily follow that the legislatures in those jurisdictions 
have deliberately concluded that it would be appropriate.”84 Accord-
ingly, the following Section will demonstrate how the death penalty 
as applied in practice to offenders who were between eighteen and 
twenty-five years old at the time of the offense is further evidence 
of the national consensus against such practice. 
2. ACTUAL PRACTICE 
A tally reveals that thirty jurisdictions permit a death sentence 
for offenders who were eighteen to twenty-five years old at the time 
of the crime.85 Focusing on this number and ignoring the legislative 
trend, a death penalty proponent may argue that this evidences a na-
tional consensus in favor of keeping the death penalty available for 
eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds. However, that “argument is in-
complete and unavailing.”86 Although the Court has declared legis-
lation to be the most “reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values,” it is only a part of the national consensus analysis.87 In fact, 
the Court has gradually removed the weight originally granted to 
legislation and now places a heavier emphasis on the actual prac-
tices.88 If thirty-nine jurisdictions permit the sentence at issue, as 
was the case in Graham, the narrow conclusion is that there is not a 
national consensus against the sentence, and therefore, it is not a 
 
 83 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 66 (2011). 
 84 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85 This tally is conservative because it includes the federal government, as 
well as the three states that currently have gubernatorial moratoria in place. States 
with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 61. 
 86 Graham, 560 U.S. at 62. 
 87 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). 
 88 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 482–86 (2012). 
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disproportionate punishment under society’s evolving standards.89 
Yet, just as this conclusion led the Court to find life without parole 
for non-homicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional, the Court may 
likewise find a death sentence for offenders who were eighteen to 
twenty-five at the time of the offense to be unconstitutional simply 
because thirty jurisdictions (including the federal government and 
three states with moratoria) permit the practice. 
While departing from the twenty-nine jurisdictions that permit-
ted mandatory life without parole for juveniles, the Miller Court 
stated that “simply counting [the jurisdictions that permit the sen-
tence at issue] would present a distorted view.”90 A simple tally 
warps the national consensus because, although many jurisdictions 
may not have technically declared the sentence illegal, “an exami-
nation of actual sentencing practices” in those jurisdictions illumi-
nates the national consensus in reality, rather than on paper.91 
Twenty states permitted death sentences for mentally disabled 
people when Atkins was decided, but in its finding of a national con-
sensus against the practice, the Court focused on the legislative trend 
away from the sentence, as well as the fact that it was an uncommon 
practice in the jurisdictions in which it was permitted.92 Similarly, 
when Roper was decided, twenty states permitted death sentences 
for offenders under the age of eighteen.93 Mirroring the reasoning in 
Atkins, the Roper Court found a national consensus against the ju-
venile death penalty based on the legislative trend and “infrequent” 
practice.94 
 
 89 Id. at 483. 
 90 Id. at 482–83. 
 91 Graham, 560 U.S. at 62. 
 92 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). In some of the states where 
the death penalty was legal, executions had not “been carried out in decades,” and 
there was therefore no need to legislate which groups to exclude from the death 
penalty in those states. Id. In the states that executed more “regularly” and had no 
ban on executing mentally disabled people, “only five ha[d] executed offenders 
possessing a known IQ less than 70 since [the Court] decided Penry.” Id. 
 93 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
 94 Id. at 564–65. Even though twenty states did not prohibit the juvenile death 
penalty, in the fifteen years since Stanford was decided, only six of those states 
actually executed offenders who committed crimes as juveniles. Id. In the latter 
ten of those years, only three states executed offenders who were juveniles at the 
time of the crime. Id. 
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Unlike in Atkins and Roper, a majority of states permitted the 
sentences at issue in Graham and Miller.95 Although thirty-nine ju-
risdictions permitted life without parole sentences for non-homicide 
juvenile offenders when Graham was decided, the Court found that 
only eleven states were actually imposing such sentences.96 The Mil-
ler Court found the State’s argument—that twenty-nine jurisdictions 
allowing mandatory juvenile life without parole sentences demon-
strated a national consensus in favor of the practice—to be a weak 
point.97 Again, the Court explained that merely looking at the num-
ber of jurisdictions that permit the practice is a “distorted view” in 
most cases.98 Once the Court in Miller considered the number of 
states that send juveniles to adult court and then “do not have sepa-
rate penalty provisions for those juvenile offenders,” as well as the 
states that impose such mandatory sentences “by virtue of generally 
applicable penalty provisions . . . without regard to age,” it found 
that the apparent legislative trend was misleading.99 
As illustrated by the four pertinent cases, the fact that a large 
number of states permit a practice may not indicate a national con-
sensus in favor of that practice. Twenty-six states currently lack any 
prohibition against the death penalty for offenders who were eight-
een to twenty-four at the time of the offense.100 This number is nei-
ther as low as the twenty states that permitted the sentences at issue 
in Atkins and Roper, nor as high as the number of states in Graham 
(thirty-nine) and Miller (twenty-nine). 
How, then, is it possible that there is a national consensus reject-
ing the application of the death penalty to offenders under twenty-
five at the time of the offense, and yet only one state has acted to 
raise the minimum age beyond what is required by Roper? Actual 
sentencing practices may provide insight as to how these two cir-
cumstances exist both simultaneously and in contradiction of one 
another. Of the twenty-six states that permit death sentences for 
 
 95 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 482–84 (2012). 
 96 Graham, 560 U.S. at 64. 
 97 Miller, 567 U.S. at 482. 
 98 Id. at 485. 
 99 Id. at 486. 
 100 States with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 61. Although thirty 
states permit the death penalty, Kentucky prohibits the death penalty for offenders 
who were under the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense, and three addi-
tional states (Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Oregon) have moratoria imposed. 
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offenders who were eighteen to twenty-five at the time of the of-
fense, three have not carried out an execution in at least fifteen years, 
four have not carried out an execution in at least ten years, and six 
have not carried out an execution in at least five years.101 In practice, 
only half of the twenty-six states have carried out executions in the 
past five years, and only eight did so in 2017 or 2018.102 Further-
more, Texas alone carried out more than half of the total executions 
in 2018.103 Removing Texas as the outlier, it becomes clear that 
overall, executions are quite rare nationwide, with seven states car-
rying out one to three executions each in the past year.104 
An even smaller fraction of states is responsible for executing 
offenders who were eighteen to twenty-four at the time of their of-
fense. While eight states carried out executions in 2018, only four 
of those states executed offenders who were under the age of twenty-
five when the offense was committed, and only one state executed 
an offender who was under twenty-one.105 Overall, seven people 
who were under the age of twenty-five at the time of their offense 
were executed in 2018. The majority of these seven were sentenced 
to death before Roper was decided, which was before brain 
 
 101 John Gramlich, 11 States That Have the Death Penalty Haven’t Used It in 
More than a Decade, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 10, 2018), http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2018/08/10/11-states-that-have-the-death-penalty-havent-
used-it-in-more-than-a-decade/. Since Gramlich’s article was written, the num-
bers have changed; Nebraska carried out its first execution since 1997, South Da-
kota carried out its first execution since 2012, and Washington abolished the death 
penalty. See Jon Herskovitz, Nebraska Carries out Its First Execution Since 1997, 
REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2018, 6:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ne-
braska-execution/nebraska-carries-out-its-first-execution-since-1997-
idUSKBN1KZ11M; Associated Press, After 7-Hour Delay, South Dakota Carries 
out First Execution Since 2012, SIOUXLAND NEWS (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://siouxlandnews.com/news/local/south-dakota-carries-out-first-execution-
since-2012; States with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 61. 
 102 The Death Penalty in 2018: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2018YrEnd.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 
2019). 
 103 Id. Texas carried out thirteen of the twenty-five total executions in 2018. 
Id. 
 104 Id. Three states carried out one execution, three states carried out two exe-
cutions, and one state carried out three executions, in addition to the thirteen peo-
ple that Texas executed. Id. 
 105 Execution List 2018, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenal-
tyinfo.org/execution-list-2018 (last visited Jan. 5, 2019). 
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development research exploded.106 Therefore, an examination of 
death sentences handed down in 2018 is even more revealing of the 
national consensus against the death penalty for offenders under the 
age of twenty-five. Forty-two death sentences were imposed in 
2018, yet only eight of those offenders were under twenty-five at the 
time of the offense, and none were under the age of twenty-one.107 
These numbers are even more illuminating in light of the fact that in 
2017, the age group that comprised the largest volume of convicted 
murderers was twenty- to twenty-four-year-olds.108 
In light of the actual practice of death sentences applied to this 
group of young offenders, the fact that only one state has raised the 
minimum age of the death penalty is not indicative of the lack of 
consensus. Because the practice is so uncommon, “there is little 
need to pursue legislation barring the execution” of offenders who 
were under the age of twenty-five at the time of the offense.109 The 
vast majority of states either outright abolished the death penalty for 
all ages, do not actively sentence people to death, or do not actually 
administer executions, particularly for offenders under the age of 
twenty-five. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the jurisdictions 
that permit the practice on paper have not “endorsed [such a sen-
tence] through deliberate, express, and full legislative considera-
tion,” because the issue rarely arises in those states.110 “[I]t is fair to 
say that a national consensus has developed against”111 executing 
offenders who were under the age of twenty-five at the time of the 
offense. 
3. SOCIETY HAS ALREADY REDRAWN THE LINE; DEATH 
PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE NEEDS TO CATCH UP 
Beyond just the scope of death penalty legislation and practices, 
broader cultural notions are indicative of a national consensus in 
 
 106 Id. Carey Dean Moore was twenty-one at the time of the offense, which 
occurred thirty-eight years before he was finally executed in 2018. Id. 
 107 Death Sentences in 2018, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenal-
tyinfo.org/2018-sentencing (last visited Jan. 5, 2019). 
 108 Number of Murder Offenders in the United States in 2017, by Age, 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/251884/murder-offenders-in-the-
us-by-age/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2019). 
 109 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). 
 110 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2011). 
 111 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. 
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favor of raising the minimum age for death sentences. General 
trends in treating young adults differently when they reach age 
eighteen, twenty-one, and twenty-five are present throughout soci-
ety. The Roper Court opened the door to criticism when it admitted 
that it settled on the age of eighteen at which to redraw “the line for 
death eligibility” merely because that is “the point where society 
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adult-
hood.”112 The Court was right—“[d]rawing the line at 18 years of 
age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against cat-
egorical rules.”113 While the Roper Court’s reasoning for drawing 
the line at eighteen may have been a legitimate “meaningful basis” 
in 2005, that line must be updated to reflect not only modern scien-
tific research, but also societal norms.114 This Section will describe 
the ways in which society draws the line between childhood and 
adulthood after age eighteen, and, therefore, why the Court’s cate-
gorical rule must be revised. 
It is true that traditionally, and in some ways still today, society 
considers a person an adult on his or her eighteenth birthday.115 So-
ciety is well aware that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles 
from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.”116 The 
idea that a person becomes an adult at age eighteen is reinforced by 
the fact that many legal rights are granted on one’s eighteenth birth-
day and are enshrined in amendments to the Constitution. However, 
one of the most notable rights in this category, the right to vote, was 
not always available to Americans at age eighteen.117 The right to 
vote was originally granted at the age of twenty-one, and only low-
ered to age eighteen when Congress could not justify drafting young 
 
 112 Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that there must be a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases 
in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not”). 
 115 Jennifer Lai, Old Enough to Vote, Old Enough to Smoke?, SLATE (Apr. 23, 
2013, 7:37 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/04/new-york-mini-
mum-smoking-age-why-are-young-people-considered-adults-at-18.html. 
 116 Roper, 534 U.S. at 574. 
 117 Jocelyn Benson & Michael T. Morley, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 
CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amend-
ments/amendment-xxvi (last visited Jan. 7, 2019). 
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men to fight in Vietnam if those same men were deprived the right 
to vote and express a voice on the war in which they would fight.118 
Yet, because “[a]dulthood is a social construct,” it is amorphous 
and changes as society learns and grows.119 As such, the period that 
marks the beginning of adulthood has changed in the last few dec-
ades, and legislatures have recognized and implemented that 
change. Now coined as a time of “emerging adulthood,” the modern 
generation of eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds are beginning 
adulthood much later than previous generations.120 As graduate de-
grees have become more common, people are getting married later, 
having children later, and “settling into long-term adult roles” 
later.121 Based on these social developments, as well as brain devel-
opment research that will be discussed infra Section II.B, legisla-
tures have enacted statutes since Roper that question the social sig-
nificance that the Court gives to the age of eighteen.122 
In fact, a study of “objective indicia of consensus, as expressed 
in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed 
the question”123 regarding what age to separate children from adults 
reveals that societal “adulthood” has moved well beyond the age of 
eighteen. Legislatures have shifted the line as far as age twenty-
six—the Affordable Care Act allows an individual to avoid the bur-
den of securing their own health insurance until age twenty-six by 
staying on his or her parent’s health insurance plan.124 The United 
States Sentencing Commission has defined youthful offenders as 
“persons age 25 or younger.”125 The Internal Revenue Service 
 
 118 The 26th Amendment, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/united-
states-constitution/the-26th-amendment (last visited Jan. 7, 2019). 
 119 Julie Beck, When Are You Really an Adult?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/01/when-are-you-really-an-
adult/422487/. 
 120 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development 
from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 469 
(2000). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
 123 Id. at 564. 
 124 How to Get or Stay on a Parent’s Plan, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/young-adults/children-under-26/ (last visited Jan. 7, 
2019). 
 125 WILLIAM H. PRYOR, JR. ET AL., Youthful Offenders in the Federal System, 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N (May 2017), 
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permits students under the age of twenty-four to remain as depend-
ents on their parents’ tax forms.126 For purposes of federal student 
aid funding, the Department of Education considers students under 
twenty-three-years-old to be dependents, “assumed to have the sup-
port of parents.”127 The federal government restricts individuals un-
der the age of twenty-one from purchasing guns.128 Notably, all of 
these examples that characterize individuals as adults at an age 
above twenty-one are federal, and hence, represent the national con-
sensus. 
However, federal agencies do not act radically or alone. The fed-
eral government incentivizes states through funding to allow indi-
viduals to remain in foster programs up to the age of twenty-one; 
half of all states take part in this program.129 Four states consider 
offenders up to the age of twenty-four to be juveniles insofar as they 
are allowed to “remain under juvenile court jurisdiction.”130 At least 
thirteen states maintain youthful offender statutes that apply to indi-
viduals up to the age of twenty-five.131 This number is growing. Ver-
mont passed legislation effective in 2018 to raise the youthful of-
fender age from seventeen to twenty-one.132 In addition, the federal 
government has been incentivizing states to maintain the minimum 
legal drinking age at twenty-one through the use of highway funding 
 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2017/20170525_youthful-offenders.pdf. 
 126 Dependents and Exemptions, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/faqs/filing-require-
ments-status-dependents-exemptions/dependents-exemptions/dependents-ex-
emptions-2 (last updated Dec. 13, 2018). 
 127 Federal Student Aid, OFFICE U.S. DEPT. EDUC., https://studen-
taid.ed.gov/sa/fafsa/filling-out/dependency (last visited Jan. 7, 2019). 
 128 18 U.S.C § 922(b)(1) (2018). 
 129 Extending Foster Care Beyond 18, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 
28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/extending-foster-care-
to-18.aspx. 
 130 Delinquency Age Boundaries, JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & 
STAT, http://www.jjgps.org/jurisdictional-boundaries#delinquency-age-bounda-
ries?year=2016&ageGroup=3 (last visited March 3, 2020). 
 131 Alex A. Stamm, Note, Young Adults Are Different, Too: Why and How We 
Can Create a Better Justice System for Young People Age 18 to 25, 95 TEX. L. 
REV. 72, 81–87 (2017). 
 132 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5280 (2018). 
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since 1984.133 Some states have extended that minimum age to the 
ability to purchase cigarettes.134 
These are only a fraction of the policies that draw the line at an 
age above eighteen, oftentimes as old as age twenty-five. Reflective 
of the trend in favor of drawing the line distinguishing juveniles 
from adults at a later age, the nation is seeing a rapid increase in 
such legislation, largely as a result of what is now known about brain 
development.135 
B. The Science to Back it Up 
The national consensus is clear—the nation is against the prac-
tice of sentencing offenders who were younger than twenty-five at 
the time of the offense to death and is in favor of redrawing the legal 
line marking the start of adulthood at least at the age of twenty-one, 
if not higher. Society has evolved in this direction as a result of its 
changing culture and advancing scientific research. The period of 
emerging adulthood—ages eighteen to twenty-five—is “character-
ized by change and exploration,” rather than marriage and babies as 
it was for prior generations.136 The reason for this cultural shift may 
be explained by recent studies on brain development, which demon-
strate that the brain is not finished developing until much later than 
older studies suggested.137 
When the Court engages in a proportionality analysis, it must 
“consider reasons for agreeing or disagreeing” with the national 
consensus after it establishes that one exists.138 The Roper Court 
sided with the national consensus against the death penalty for of-
fenders under the age of eighteen when it exercised its “own inde-
pendent judgment” because it found brain development research 
proved younger offenders to be less culpable offenders.139 Brain 
 
 133 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2018). 
 134 Raising the Tobacco Age to 21, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/us/sale-age-21 (last updated Aug. 
30, 2018). 
 135 See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, PUBLIC HEALTH 
IMPLICATIONS OF RAISING THE MINIMUM AGE OF LEGAL ACCESS TO TOBACCO 
PRODUCTS 3–6 (2015). 
 136 Arnett, supra note 120, at 469. 
 137 See INST. OF MED. NAT’L ACADEMIES, supra note 135, at 78. 
 138 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002). 
 139 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564, 567 (2005). 
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development research was only first emerging in a mainstream way 
in 2005 when Roper was decided, and as a result, it was essentially 
the first time that the Court relied on neuroscience in a “decision[] 
about developmental differences between adolescents and 
adults.”140 This was likely a factor in the Court’s hesitancy to raise 
the minimum death penalty age higher than eighteen. 
However, since 2005, it has become “well established” that 
“characteristic developmental changes” in the brain are “not com-
plete until approximately twenty-five years of age.”141 Crucially, the 
part of the brain that remains underdeveloped into the mid-twenties 
is the same part of the brain that the Court found reduced the culpa-
bility of juvenile offenders—the prefrontal cortex.142 The prefrontal 
cortex’s stage of development can explain the reasoning behind an 
immature decision that has consequences of life or death, as it “plays 
a central and pervasive role in human cognition.”143 It is the part of 
the brain that allows an individual to “exercise good judgment when 
presented with difficult life situations,” “control the expression of 
intense emotions,” control “impulse,” and resist making risky deci-
sions in the presence of friends.144 
An informed appreciation of the effects of an underdeveloped 
prefrontal cortex in young adults supports what has long been illus-
trated by crime data showing that “young adult crime does not de-
fine offenders, but rather is ‘a transitory state that they age out 
of.’”145 
 
 140 Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court 
Decisions About Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REVIEWS 
NEUROSCIENCE 513, 513 (2013). 
 141 Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE TREATMENT 449, 451 (2013). 
 142 Youthful Offenders in the Federal System, supra note 125, at 7. 
 143 Cassandra B. Romine & Cecil R. Reynolds, A Model of the Development 
of Frontal Lobe Functioning: Findings from a Meta-Analysis, 12 APPLIED 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 190, 190 (2005). 
 144 Arain et al., supra note 141, at 453, 456. 
 145 Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Intersection Between Young Adult Sentencing and 
Mass Incarceration, 2018 WIS. L REV. 669, 678 (quoting JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED 
IN: THE TRUE CAUSE OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL 
REFORM 190–91 (2017)). 
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C. Penological Goals 
As with all Eighth Amendment proportionality analyses before 
the Court, national consensus does not conclude the inquiry on a 
proper legal threshold of adulthood. Though  “evolving standards” 
and “objective evidence of contemporary values”146 carry great 
weight, the Court must also use “its independent judgment.”147 To 
make a determination regarding the constitutionality of a punish-
ment, the Court must look to the root of the question that the pro-
portionality analysis poses: is the punishment disproportionate to the 
crime?148 The final judgment is informed by precedent and the 
Court’s “own understanding of the Constitution and the rights it se-
cures.”149 
Because “the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the 
Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.”150 The Court 
has labeled its death penalty jurisprudence as “narrowing,” as it 
“seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to 
death.”151 As such, to be considered a constitutionally permissible 
punishment, the death penalty as applied must “measurably contrib-
ute[] to one or both” of the penological goals which the death pen-
alty seeks to further; otherwise, the punishment “‘is nothing more 
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,’ 
and hence [is] an unconstitutional punishment.”152 
The Supreme Court’s precedent makes clear that for the same 
reasons that the state’s penological goals are not furthered by sen-
tencing juveniles to death, they likewise are not furthered by sen-
tencing offenders under the age of twenty-five to death. In Roper, 
the Court pointed to specific differences between juveniles and 
adults that require juveniles to be excluded from the group of “of-
fenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes” 
for whom capital punishment is reserved.153 The Court found that 
 
 146 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434, 435 (2008). 
 147 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564, 567 (2005). 
 148 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. 
 149 Id. at 435. 
 150 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. 
 151 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
 152 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). 
 153 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. 
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the presence of characteristics such as “lack of maturity,” “underde-
veloped sense of responsibility,” “vulnerab[ility] . . . to negative in-
fluences,” and lack of “well formed” character in juveniles “often 
result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”154 The 
Court held that because of these differences, juveniles are less cul-
pable offenders, and imposing the death penalty on them would not 
serve any penological goal.155 
Because recent studies now clarify that the characteristics that 
make juveniles less culpable do not fully fade until the age of 
twenty-five,156 it follows logically that offenders under the age of 
twenty-five have diminished culpability.157 Thus, neither of the 
death penalty’s penological goals is served when applied to offend-
ers under the age of twenty-five. 
Retribution hinges on the culpability of the offender.158 It is “not 
proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one 
whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial 
degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”159 The part of the brain 
that develops last controls an individual’s ability to resist impulses 
and the urge to engage in reckless behavior.160 These are the same 
characteristics that the Court cited as causing juveniles to be less 
culpable and thus, the juvenile death penalty less serving of retribu-
tive goals.161 
The goal of deterrence is likewise not met. The Roper Court 
found that “the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpa-
ble [make them] less susceptible to deterrence.”162 In particular, the 
inability of juveniles to engage in a “‘cost-benefit analysis’” led the 
Court to find an “absence of evidence of deterrent effect.”163 Now 
that research has established that the prefrontal cortex remains 
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underdeveloped “well into the 20s,” the same inability to consider 
consequences and “take stock of a situation” likely causes offenders 
under the age of twenty-five to be less responsive to deterrence.164 
Because brain development occurs gradually as individuals 
grow closer to the age of twenty-five, they are likely to have a more 
developed prefrontal cortex and their culpability is less likely to be 
diminished by “a substantial degree.”165 Therefore, if the Court 
raises the minimum death penalty age to twenty-five, there will be 
some offenders who are able to skirt the death penalty merely be-
cause of their age, despite potentially deserving the most severe pun-
ishment. Yet, the same was said about eighteen-year-olds when 
Roper was decided.166 
The Court acknowledged that one of the problems with drawing 
the categorical line at eighteen is that “some under 18 have already 
attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”167 As a 
society, we must ask whether we would rather spare the lives of our 
nation’s youth, whose underdeveloped brains may have resulted in 
the commission of a heinous crime, or protect the “express[ion of] 
the community’s moral outrage” at the risk of killing offenders 
whose immaturity overshadowed their culpability.168 National con-
sensus appears to weigh more heavily in favor of the former, and as 
neither penological goal is served by sentencing offenders under 
twenty-five to death, the Court should follow that consensus. 
Not only does sentencing offenders under the age of twenty-five 
to death fail to “measurably contribute[] to one or both” of the pe-
nological goals, these offenders are also superior candidates for al-
ternative punishments.169 This age group is at a stage of “heightened 
plasticity,” which makes them easily influenced by experiences.170 
As a result, they are the most susceptible to the benefits of 
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rehabilitation, a penological goal arguably served by imprisonment, 
but certainly not by death.171 
III. THE COURT SHOULD FIND SENTENCING OFFENDERS UNDER 
TWENTY-FIVE TO DEATH UNCONSTITUTIONAL—BUT WILL IT? 
The addition of two Supreme Court justices in less than two 
years brings great uncertainty to the future of many controversial 
topics, including death penalty jurisprudence. How the new Court 
will decide death penalty cases is of particular intrigue for two rea-
sons. First, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s retirement means the loss of 
the key swing vote in death penalty cases, and second, Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh’s stance cannot be reasonably predicted, as he has yet to 
directly confront the issue. 
A. Kennedy’s Legacy 
Although appointed by a Republican president172 and considered 
to be a “lifelong Republican,”173 Justice Kennedy was “never a reli-
able conservative.”174 While it is true that he cast more conservative 
than liberal votes in his three decades on the bench, many landmark 
cases would not have resulted in liberal decisions absent Justice 
Kennedy’s vote.175 Death penalty law is one area in which Justice 
Kennedy cast votes and authored majority opinions that contributed 
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to his reputation as “the pivotal swing vote.”176 Most notably, Justice 
Kennedy wrote the Roper 5–4 majority opinion, which declared the 
juvenile death penalty unconstitutional.177 He also wrote the major-
ity opinion that declared the death penalty unconstitutional for non-
homicide offenses, also a 5-4 decision.178 He wrote the Graham ma-
jority opinion, declaring that life without parole sentences for juve-
niles who committed non-homicide offenses are unconstitutional.179 
And finally, he provided the swing vote necessary for the Court’s 
decision that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles 
are unconstitutional.180 
Notwithstanding the individuals ages eighteen to twenty-five 
who continue to be sentenced to death and life without parole de-
spite immature brain functioning, without Justice Kennedy, the 
numbers would be much more alarming. Justice Kennedy’s power-
ful swing vote essentially granted him the power to control the ju-
risprudential meaning of the Eighth Amendment.181 His retirement 
may also mean the loss of the Court as “a venue for a systemic attack 
on capital punishment.”182 
B. Kavanaugh’s Future 
It is difficult to predict whether Justice Kennedy’s successor will 
continue his legacy of supporting defendants’ rights. Justice 
Kavanaugh did not encounter any death penalty related cases during 
his twelve years on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, nor was he 
confronted with any questions regarding his views on the death 
penalty during the confirmation process.183 Regardless, many 
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scholars predict that the replacement of Justice Kennedy with “a 
more doctrinaire law-and-order conservative”184 is not just a setback 
for death penalty jurisprudence, but rather “a death knell.”185 While 
Justice Kennedy has been described as a “heterodox jurist,” Justice 
Kavanaugh is considered “a reliably conservative judge.”186 
Yet contrary to what many scholars are predicting,187 the Court’s 
steady trend away from the constitutionality of the death penalty188 
may not be halted by Justice Kavanaugh. Prior to his confirmation 
to the Supreme Court, Justice Kavanaugh was only involved in one 
case involving a death row inmate, and it did not involve any Eighth 
Amendment analysis.189 Therefore, it is necessary to analyze Justice 
Kavanaugh’s writings and public speeches to produce an informed 
projection. This Section will provide two reasons why Justice 
Kavanaugh should find death sentences unconstitutional for 
offenders under the age of twenty-five, should the issue come before 
the Court. 
First, Justice Kavanaugh’s views on sentencing inform how he 
may decide death penalty cases. He has expressed the opinion that 
courts should return to a mandatory sentencing system, particularly 
because judges naturally “bring their own personal philosophies 
[and] their personal views on particular issues into the 
courtroom.”190 Because he has expressed concern about disparities 
that often result from advisory guidelines, he has consistently 
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pushed for a mandatory sentencing system.191 Although Justice 
Kavanaugh did not refer specifically to death sentences, the death 
penalty is applied more disparately than any other sentence, with 
only eight states using the practice in 2018.192 Because the Supreme 
Court has already held that mandatory death sentences are 
unconstitutional, the only solution to this sentencing disparity 
through implementation of a mandatory system is to make it 
unconstitutional. If Justice Kavanaugh intends to remain consistent 
with his jurisprudence on mandatory uniform sentencing guidelines, 
he would need to either err on the side of eliminating the death 
penalty, or support making the death penalty mandatory for certain 
offenses. 
Second, Justice Kavanaugh “emphatically” dissented when the 
majority held that despite the “mandatory thirty-year sentence for 
any person who carries a machine gun while committing a crime of 
violence,” the government is not required “to prove that the 
defendant knew the weapon he was carrying was capable of firing 
automatically.”193 In other words, the majority ruled that even if the 
defendant was not aware that the weapon he was carrying was a 
machine gun, he must receive this mandatory sentence.194 Justice 
Kavanaugh expressed disturbance with the court’s imposition of “an 
extra 20 years of mandatory imprisonment based on a fact the 
defendant did not know.”195 He called this practice “unjust and 
incompatible with deeply rooted principles of American law.”196 
In the same way that it is unjust to imprison a defendant for 
twenty additional years by “dispensing with mens rea,” it is likewise 
unjust to sentence offenders under the age of twenty-five to death.197 
Discounting mens rea, or the intent to commit an act, is analogous 
to ignoring the fact that eighteen to twenty-five-year-olds lack the 
physical ability to properly assess options and make decisions, 
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exacerbated in the presence of peer pressure or negative emotions, 
which are often factors in adolescent crime.198 
Because Justice Kavanaugh stated that “[t]he debate over mens 
rea is not some philosophical or academic exercise,” as “[i]t has ma-
jor real-world consequences for criminal defendants,” he should rec-
ognize that there should be no debate over sentencing offenders un-
der the age of twenty-five to death—the most severe real-world con-
sequence.199 This is not a simple policy debate—scientists have 
proven that individuals under the age of twenty-five lack developed 
brain functions, making them less capable of having the required 
mens rea, and therefore less culpable. These individuals are not the 
most culpable offenders, and, therefore, should not be sentenced 
with the harshest punishment. Justice Kavanaugh similarly con-
cluded that when a defendant lacks mens rea, they have a lessened 
“moral depravity.”200 
CONCLUSION 
As society evolves and develops, the barbaric punishments of 
the past become recognized as such. Legislative trends and actual 
practices demonstrate the movement against applying the death pen-
alty to offenders who were under the age of twenty-five at the time 
of the crime and show the favorability of redrawing the line that dis-
tinguishes juveniles from adults above age eighteen. Moreover, the 
nation is not evolving faster than the rest of the world. In fact, the 
United States is the only country in the western hemisphere that 
committed executions in 2017.201 As more countries enact legisla-
tion to abolish the death penalty and fewer countries impose and 
carry out executions, it is clear that “the global trend [is] towards 
abolition of the death penalty.202 
Given the opportunity to decide the question of whether death 
sentences are a constitutional punishment for offenders under the 
 
 198 Johnson et al., supra note 160, at 217. 
 199 Burwell, 690 F.3d at 553. 
 200 Id. 
 201 AMNESTY INT’L, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 2017 6 (2018) 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Docu-
ments/ACT5079552018ENGLISH.pdf. 
 202 Id. at 5. 
2020] EXPANDING JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY BAN 995 
 
age of twenty-five, the Court should consider these trends in its pro-
portionality analysis. Moreover, it should find no reason to disagree 
with the consensus because of the scientific research on brain devel-
opment. The Court should rely on the same reasoning it applied in 
Roper and extend the ban to offenders under twenty-five, as science 
now confirms that the same characteristics that make juveniles less 
culpable remain until at least the age of twenty-five.203 Once it rec-
ognizes the diminished culpability of offenders under twenty-five, 
the Court must find that neither retribution nor deterrence justifies 
sentencing these offenders to death. Thus, the punishment is dispro-
portionate to the crime and must be declared unconstitutional. 
Many political tides have turned since 2015 when Justice Scalia 
said that he “wouldn’t be surprised if the [C]ourt voted to abolish 
[the death penalty] soon.”204 With a crucial swing voter gone and 
the addition of two conservative justices, only time will tell if Justice 
Scalia’s predictions were accurate. However, if Justice Kavanaugh 
follows his own logic and precedent, he very well may rule against 
the death penalty for offenders under twenty-five. 
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